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COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTrH AND REALITY IN AiERICAN JUSTICE. By Jerome
Frank. Princeton University Press, 1949. Pp. xii, 440. $5.00.
IN one of the dream-sequences of Through the Looking Glass, Alice found
herself in a little dark shop where an old sheep sat knitting behind the
counter. She looked around her to see just what was on the shelves. "The
shop seemed to be full of all manner of curious things-but the oddest part
of it all was that, whenever she looked hard at any shelf, to make out
exactly what it had on it, that particular shelf was always quite empty,
though the others round it were crowded as full as they could hold."
This is the kind of nightmare sensation that is likely to come when for
the first time one examines critically some shelf or other in the shop he is
used to call his cosmos. Philosophic inquiry at its outset is an agitating
experience, charged with vertigo and sudden discomforts. Whoever engages
in it in the skeptical manner that intellectual honesty compels will appear
to be snatching away his neighbors' familiar supports. Hence for some
twenty years (since Law And The Modern Mind) Jerome Frank's writings
have met with two classes of readers: one, those whose disturbance led only
to resentment; the other, those whose disturbance prompted them to reassess
old assumptions, to grapple with new challenges, and to feel grateful for the
light he had let into the dark shop. For the latter group and for anyone
hardy enough to join them, the publication of Courts on Trial is an important
event, because this is his most illuminating work.
Addressed as it is to the general public, the book is written in an easy,
pungent, and relatively simple style. Thus it invites reading on more than
one level; in fact, sophisticated students are likely to find more beneath than
above the apparently smooth surface of the text. And to those who, like
myself, receive a very modest income of insights and ideas, Judge Frank
seems, as in his earlier works, to be flinging his revenue about in an almost
prodigal fashion. But then, considering the intellectual expenditure he has
been able to maintain these many years, who will venture to call him a
spendthrift? Fortunately, certain of the book's ideas can be recognized as
variations of what Judge Frank has said before, and it is enlightening to see
how these familiar thoughts draw new cogence and direction from the gen-
eral thesis to which they contribute.
The thesis is entitled "fact-skepticism." It is developed with such a
variety of illustration, analogical digression, and exposition of corollary ap-
plications (e.g., to the problems of legal education) that this review will be-
come hopelessly lost unless we resolve to stay on the highway. The highway
is directed toward a fundamental reformation of popular understanding of
the nature of the judicial process. En route, certain significant procedural
reforms are recommended, but Judge Frank would probably agree that they
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are not inextricably attached to "fact-skepticism" and that his principal
theme may be considered independently, on its own merits.
Stated as bluntly as possible, this theme is: a court generally decides a
case without knowledge of the relevant circumstances that actually occurred
and in reliance on a mistaken belief in other circumstances that actually did
not occur, i.e., on "the wrong facts." Judge Frank buttresses this conclusion
with copious reasons and illustrations, neglecting no argument in vindica-
tion of his "fact-skepticism." Some of the reasons (those that result from
defects in judicial method) are curable or at least mitigable, but others, aris-
ing out of faulty human capacity to observe, to remember, to articulate,
etc., are bound to remain with us permanently. Modern litigation, heir of
the magical ordeal and of the resort to brute force, is miles removed from a
scientific investigation into the truth of "what actually happened." Amid
the conflicts of testimony, the stratagems of counsel, the prejudices and
perjuries, amid the blind of eye, the lame of memory, and the halt of articu-
lation-the judges and the juries, themselves myopic and inept, sit and ren-
der judgment; and no one ever discerns the "true" facts of the case.
On the way to this conclusion, the lay reader (and many of us at the bar)
will learn much concerning the operations of the courts and the views of
contemporary theorists. These by-products are very valuable regardless of
one's attitude towards the author's incidental positions. I for one would be
inclined to except to (1) the sharpness of the dichotomy between rule of
law and finding of fact,1 which is maintained through most of the book and
appears inadequately relieved by the brief treatment of Gestalt, 2 (2) the
supposed relative clarity of the law-rules, and (3) the treatment of "natural
law" as an influence on the law side only of the dichotomy. But as to judge
Frank's principal thesis-the inaccessibility of the "true" facts-I am con-
vinced and freely assent.
Once having assented, however, I would suggest that the thesis gives rise
to certain further questions that Judge Frank may see fit to consider fully
in the future. (That the questions are phrased here tendentiously does not
mean that they are intended as answers).
In an ordinary civil litigation, are we or the parties really interested in
ascertaining the "true," transcendental, mind-of-God facts? Is it not
enough to conduct a rigorous examination of recollections to make them as
sincere and careful as possible in the present (which is all we ever have)? Is
not the controversy causing its individual and social disturbances vw?
Should we not focus on a decision (a value judgment), i.e., some concededly
1. As I see it, the search for a major premise is like the search for a mate: it
changes both parties. Judge Frank's mathematical phrasing [R(ule) x F(acts) =
D(ecision)] correctly implies the functional modification of F by R and of R by F; the
ultimate subsumption of F to R comes only after each has received the imprint of the other.
2. The best literary instance of Gestalt emergence is Robert Browning's magnificent
THE RING AND THE BOOK.
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imperfect and approximate resolution that will send the litigants back to
their respective pursuits and to the use of their non-litigated rights?3
Does not the adversary method of litigation at least promote relative
impartiality of the tribunal? 4 If our objective is a decision rather than a
finding of scientific accuracy -(verification by controlled experiment being
generally impossible), is not the partisan political debate a relevant analogy
to the same limited extent as scientific method?
The answers to these questions would, I hope, indicate that the shelf of
adjudication is not nearly so bare as it first appears in the light of Judge
Frank's thesis. If the answers are in the affirmative, then the litigative
process is not a mere juggling with myths and its decisions are not congen-
itally based on the "wrong facts." In general, such data as a liberalized
procedure would disclose do seem to be all the data that make up the con-
troversy at the time of trial. They are the "right facts" to be evaluated in
deciding it, whether or not they have noumenal counterparts in the past.
On the other hand, future fact-findings appear quite as unpredictable as
Judge Frank insists they are. And that unpredictability (both kx and
jusitia being feminine) is almost completely irreducible. Such being the
case, how much utilitarian value remains in Holmes' treatment of a legal
right as "the hypostasis of a prophecy"? Viewed in the light of this radical
unpredictability, Holmes' analysis might seem to deny the existence of any
rights except those already adjudicated in specific litigations betveen the
same parties: the outcome of future litigation concerning other rights or
other parties would be mere guesswork. "Hypostasis of a prophecy" may
somehow be made to include a reservation (or an auxiliary prophecy) that,
in all probability, the instant right will not be contested before a court or
administrative agency. Perhaps the moral is that Holmes' highly useful in-
sight has been extended beyond its legitimate province. Perhaps societal
practice, which pays a right its wages on the assumption of good health and
regards the advent of litigation the way we regard cancer (as something
terrible that may happen to someone else) is an equally suggestive criterion.
These are indeed profound questions, but it will not do to withhold praise
of a preeminent book until they can be thought through to a firm position.
Those of us who were introduced to the law in the conceptualistic murk of
the 1920s are bound to remember with gratitude the brave company of so-
3. A similar reaction is expressed in Max Radin's sagacious book, L vw As LoGic
AN ExPmEnINcE cc. II-IV (1940), but with a special emphasis on arbitrational values
and on the hope that the disputants may be induced to go forth and do business again
vwith each other. This would shift the focus from the partly knownbut irrecoverable past
to the future with its compound contingencies, and thus might generate more grievances
than it cured. Would not the dimensions of the problem be reduced by analysis of our
system's emphasis on substitutional relief?
4. See CALAMANDREI, EULOGY OF JUDGEs 52-5 (1942). Judge Frank's sharp
criticisms of the adversary method are not followed by a recommendation that it be
abandoned. The reforms he proposes are modest and, for the most part, obviously needed
to realize the very values that have been traditionally ascribed to the adversary method.
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called "realists" who forced the windows open and gave us light and air.
Foremost of that band, Jerome Frank continues-with zest and sparkle-
to disturb the complacent, to shock the intellectual prudes, and to lay a
youthfully tempestuous siege to the heart of justice. Of all men, he may
be least concerned by the gap between the excitements of the present and
the past's pathetic illusion.
EDmOND N. CAHNt
UNIONS AND CAPITALISm. By Charles E. Lindblom. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1949. Pp. xi, 267. $3.75.
IT is trite but true to point out that modern western civilization has made
incredible advances in the knowledge of techniques, but has failed pitifully
in its understanding of the proper or desirable use of these techniques. Just
as we have developed procedures which lead to atomic fission but have not
learned how to restrict its use to human betterment (since we cannot even
define the latter term), so have we developed the machinery of effective
unionism without a clear knowledge of the purposes which unionism is
properly to serve. Professor Lindblom does not give us glib answers to the
question, but for the first time the problem is effectively pointed up and a
gauntlet has been hurled at the feet of all students of labor-management
relations, whether they be scholars of jurisprudence, economics, political
science, or sociology. Unions and Capitalism will be a burr under the saddle
for all who read it, and all persons interested in the general subject will,
sooner or later, find it necessary to read it.
It is impossible to compress this book any more than has been done be-
tween covers by the author; no summary of its contents can be accurate.
But since the readers of a review are entitled to a clue as to the content of a
book, I will undertake a generalized statement of the central theme. Unions,
in their present form, developed inevitably out of the necessities of their
environment. Because of their correct adaptation they may be applauded.
However, the form of these same unions also tends toward the destruction of
the free and democratic capitalism to which the American people are de-
voted. Because of their destructive influence upon a desirable free economy
they must be deplored. The reasons for the latter conclusion are numerous,
but the principle is made clear in the following: "No monopoly except that
of the commodity labor could ever reach into every corner of the economy,
every industry, every occupation, every product. And hence no other power
can so effectively challenge the rules of the competitive game as unionism-
ever determined to 'take wages out of competition' and succeeding." I
Professor Lindblom is well aware of the fact that there are other forces




within capitalism which tend toward the destruction of capitalism-cor-
porate strength, government, and international competition, for example.
He says: "Abolish unionism and the competitive system would still be
threatened. .... The importance of union power is that it hastens its de-
cline and will govern in large part the form of the new institutional arrange-
ments which are being created to take the place of the market." 2
All things change; we could not have it otherwise if we would. But if
man's intelligence be adequate, he can to some extent direct the route of
change. Perhaps the free competition of the American Dream is a will-o'-the-
wisp. But unless we are to move into the brutalities of a fascist economy we
must know what alternative is preferred and how to get there. Professor
Lindblom's book is a fundamental prolegomenon to these questions.
The book is certain to be misunderstood (and, for this reason, unfavora-
bly received) by many readers. Among the liberals will be some who de-
nounce it as a "union-busting tract." On the other hand, there will probably
be a few reactionaries who will take Lindblom to task for a seeming accept-
ance of the Marxian doctrine that "capitalism contains the seeds of its own
destruction." Each viewpoint can find passages to support its contention.
By way of reply, it can only be suggested that these people read the book
again, and read it more carefully. They may then understand that Professor
Lindblom is the kind of liberal who welcomes change, but who fears blind
and unreasoned change. The book, read carefully and taken in its entirety,
proclaims him thus without equivocation.
Another criticism of the Lindblom thesis must be taken more seriously.
Is it really correct to say that unionism (as it is) is more destructive of capi-
talism than any other institution within the economy? It was not unionism
which destroyed free enterprise in Hitler's Germany, in Mussolini's Italy,
or in Stalin's Russia. Would it not be more correct to say that unionism
shares with other institutions the participation in social change? It would
perhaps be still more correct to say that the changes in developing unionism
are part of the changes in the whole of capitalism. This is a question which
we may hope will receive further consideration from Professor Lindblom
as he broadens his study. In any event, he has made his point in the present
volume, even though the point may be a bit too sharp. It is a point which
requires careful consideration by all thoughtful scholars.
WmiAm S. HoPmmsf
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, VOLUME 1. By Richard R. Powell. New
York: Matthew Bender & Company, 1949. Pp. xiii, 792. $16.50.
T E first volume of Professor Powell's magnum opus demonstrates be-
yond question what we are all well aware of, that he is a thorough, con-
2. P. 139.
' Director of the Institute of Labor Economics, University of Washington.
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scientious scholar and teacher in the general field of Real Property. The
Volume is divided into two parts. Part I, labeled Introduction, contains a
short discussion of the meaning and origin of the term property; a discussion
of the vocabulary to be used in the treatise; a somewhat broader than usual
short synopsis of the English background on land tenure; and a three-hun-
dred page treatment of the sources of American Real Property law including
a state-by-state survey. This survey is the product of a good deal of original
research and is not usually treated as a separate subject in other general
treatises. Part II, entitled Capacity to Hold and to Deal with Interests in
Land, discusses the protection of aliens, infants, mental incompetents and so
forth and the treatment of non-profit and profit, non-incorporated and in-
corporated associations, fiduciaries and governmental instrumentalities. On
most of these subjects Professor Powell seems to do a very thorough job of
collecting the cases and statutes. Lawyers often need to consult these
sources. A lot of painstaking and frequently not too enjoyable work has
been done for them and they should all be thankful to Professor Powell.
Does the book do any more than collect this sort of material? In Part I
Professor Powell tells us that he will use the terminology of the Restatement
and Hohfeld. 1 The possible evil consequences of this have frequently been
stated by Professor McDougal and also to some extent by Judge Charles E.
Clark. They need not be reiterated here, especially since their impact will
probably be felt more in Professor Powell's subsequent volumes. Still, let
the reader beware! More encouraging is Professor Powell's remark in his
introduction that he wants to know "most important of all" the extent to
which present manifestations of the institution of property "promote the
welfare of the society in which it functions." This rather novel approach for
modern treatise writers in this field does bear fruit occasionally. Sometimes
the author presents his subject in a social setting. Here and there there is an
attempt to appraise the desirability of a particular rule. But it is all very
spotty. The social setting and appraisal is sketchy and almost always over-
whelmed by the heavy, traditional, case documented text. Indeed, on the
whole, Professor Powell's organization of material, in this volume, at least,
does not aid a policy-oriented approach to the subject.
As to the historical material which takes up practically half of the book,
one wonders to some extent what it is for. Professor Powell warns us that
unless we know something about past practices and reasons for their
existence we cannot understand and reform the present. But he tells us
right in the beginning of his section on American Sources that his is a
book of law and not of history. This suggests that without history the
picture will be so incomplete as to be unrealistic and of no current use-
fulness. What follows largely supports this premonition. Thus while Pro-
fessor Powell comprehensively surveys the so-called economic, political,




colonists to settle here, all his scholarship simply yields broad conclusions
about "law" of no apparent significance today. For example, we are shown
that in the early years colonial law, though displaying traces of English law
"took most of its substance and all of its form and detail from the common
sense reacions of common folk to the basic problems of maintaining life
under the conditions encountered in the New World." 2 And, in the same
vein, we are also told that "the reception of the common law can be re-
garded as the joint product of (a) the English government's desire to unify
the colonies for purposes of the empire's commercial gain; and (b) the col-
onists' desire to gain freedom from tyranny and exploitation by asserting
the inherited 'rights of Englishmen.' " 3 Most of the rest of the historical
discussion simply consists of a literal chronological description of basic leg-
islation and cases, state by state, and contains amusing bits such as that
in 1939 a Delaware case reversed an 1873 case and declared that the English
doctrine of "ancient lights" was "unsuited to our condition." 4
In short, Professor Powell has made an attempt to do more than write a
"standard" treatise. But what he has done beyond the expected seems, as
far as this present volume goes, to be marked by too much detail and not
enough significance.
DAVID HABERt
CASES AND READINGS ON CRInnNA LAw AND PRoC=uRul. By Jerome Hall.
Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1949. Pp. xiv, 996. $7.00.
Two or three years back, Jerome Hall published his General Priniples of
Criminal Law, which was widely acclaimed as a noteworthy contribution to
criminal jurisprudence. Now Hall has prepared a casebook in which he has
organized the materials to accord with his theories of criminal law. Readers
familiar with Hall's work know his categorization of criminal law into prin-
ciples, doctrines and rules. Applying this analysis, the casebook deals first
with the principles of criminal law-those fundamental ideas running
through the entire body of criminal law. Part II deals with the specific
characteristics of the several crimes (rules), and Part III with the general
characteristics common to all crimes (doctrines). In addition, some 250
pages are devoted to criminal procedure.
By "principles" Hall means those fundamental ideas which are concerned
with the ultimate notions of criminal law theory: "crime" and "punish-
ment." These principles directly concern (1) certain external consequences
("Harms"), (2) which are legally forbidden (principle of legality); (3) con-




t Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School
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duct; (6) a "causal" relationship between the legally forbidden harms and
the voluntary misconduct; and (7) (legally prescribed) punishment.' The
chapter on these fundamental principles is placed first in the book in order
to tell students "what to look for when reading criminal cases." 2
Some criminal law teachers may deem it not worth while to spend the
first forty-five pages of a casebook on the "principle of legality," namely,
that crimes must be narrowly defined, punishments must be prescribed,
that ex post facto laws are forbidden and that criminal statutes must be
strictly construed. But in the 20th century, when we have seen these pro-
positions challenged in other legal systems, it is perhaps well not to ignore
them as too elementary to require discussion.
The four short cases on Harms are designed to illustrate the general prin-
ciple that harm is an essential element of every crime; the further truth
that each legal definition of a crime involves a more or less specific harm is
left to be developed in connection with the several crimes.
The section on conduct seems less successful. The purpose is to illustrate
the general principle that a criminal intent does not constitute crime without
"an overt act or some open evidence of an intended crime" (quoting Black-
stone). But the cases chosen to make this point, involving as they do the
law of parties, lack of consciousness, respondeat superior, neglect of duty and
solicitation, even though as a matter of sound theory they may all be re-
garded as applications of the same general principle, yet raise the question
whether it is sound teaching technique in eight short pages at the outset of
the course to touch upon so many topics that will have to be enlarged upon
later.'
Readers of Hall's Principles will remember that one of the most striking
propositions there urged was his defense of the unitary concept of Mens rea,
in opposition to the position of such writers as Stephen, who considered the
term meaningless, since "there is no one such state of mind." I In conformity
with that position, Hall in his casebook includes mens rea among the general
principles, but it is worth noting that it is given very little space, most of the
cases in the section being devoted to distinguishing intent from motive.
Part II, dealing with "rules"-i.e., with the specific material elements of
various crimes-shows an interesting difference in treatment of different
crimes. Crimes against the person and crimes against "property and person"
(robbery, arson, burglary), are treated legalistically. The material consists
almost wholly of cases, with a minimum of text or footnotes.! The law of
1. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 10-11 (1947).
2. P.2.
3. I raise this doubt with some diffidence. The proof of any casebook is its effective-
ness as a teaching tool. I have not used Hall's Cases in teaching the course, and it is
quite possible that this introductory survey of the various situations covered by the con-
cept of conduct will prove an excellent teaching device.
4. 2 STEPHEN, HiISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWS OF ENGLAND 95 (1883).
5. The major exception is in the section on sexual crimes, which includes a seventeen-
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theft, on the other hand, is treated in relation to social problems. The
premise is that if the student has made use of the fundamental principles in
analyzing the crimes against the person, he can do so in other crimes, and
that he is now ready to learn to take account of other important aspects of
criminal law, namely, the relation of criminal law to social problems and the
use of non-legal disciplines to acquire the necessary knowledge. The law of
theft was selected as the specific instance for such a study "because the
available materials comprise an excellent laboratory for the indicated pur-
poses." 6 This is true, and it is true largely because of Hall's own previous
contributions on the subject. Included in the chapter on theft are textual
materials on the relationship of larceny, embezzlement and obtaining, on the
subject matter of larceny, and on receiving stolen property, most of them
taken from Hall's well-known work on Theft, Law and Society. Two of the
longest of these are included specifically to illustrate (1) the method of
institutional legal history (an excerpt from Theft, Law and Society on the
growth of the law of theft in the eighteenth century), and (2) the method of
factual research, illustrated by the author's study of the business of dealing
in stolen goods, also taken from the same book.
It is significant that these methods are merely illustrated in this one chap-
ter. They are not consistently used in other chapters. Those familiar with
Hall's views will not find this surprising. The principal end to him is "jus-
tice." Deterrence and rehabilitation of the criminal, and "the general
good" of society, are secondary. 7 Factual research is not to be stressed at
the expense of fundamental principles.
Part II also includes a chapter on strict liability-a concept which Hall
attacked with great ability and great vigor in his Principles, as an "anachron-
ism" which "stands as the major bar to rational solution of important social
problems" 8 and for which he proposed constructive alternatives in the form
of "sound legislation, inspection, licensing, information, investigation by
boards, informal conferences, and publicity." 9 But in the casebook, the
cases on strict liability are presented without editorial comment.
Part III, dealing with doctrines,--the general material elements-includes
such matters as mistake of fact and of law, necessity and coercion, incapacity
page excerpt from a law review article on sexual offenders and a five-page book review
on the Kinsey Report.
At the end of each section, short bibliographies are appended. In a note in the first
chapter (p. 45) the student is urged to read carefully at least one of the items listed in
each bibliography, and then to re-examine the cases. But if students are expected to take
this advice to heart, the practical problem of the strain on the law school library will
have to be faced. Most of the bibliographies contain only two or three references. Even
in the smallest law schools, criminal law classes are likely to be large enough to make the
problem of making the materials available a very real one.
6. P.287.
7. HALT, GEmAL PRwc--ILEs OF CaXaNAr. LAw 129-30 (1947).
8. Id. at 343.
9. Id.at 309.
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(infancy, insanity, intoxication) and doctrines concerning relational crimes
and complicity (attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, parties). Hall, who has
urged that the principle of legality be applied to condemn judicial decisions
"which are unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had
been expressed prior to the conduct in issue," 10 includes under mistake of
law cases distinguishing ignorance of law from the legality of the conduct,
and cases where mens rea includes knowledge of illegality. On the other
hand, entrapment, consent and condonation get only a quick summary in
two pages of notes.
The cases devoted to criminal procedure include, in addition to the more
usual topics, such headings as procedural effects of illegal arrest (habeas
corpus, jurisdiction, exclusion of evidence), special pleas, interstate extradi-
tion, and federal removal.
A teacher confronted with the question what casebook to adopt must
first decide what he wants to accomplish in the course. Presumably he
wants to implant a certain amount of information about "the law" on the
subject, but that involves no difficulty of choice; all the casebooks in the
field do that reasonably well. Certainly, Hall's does it as well as most. If,
over and above that, the instructor wants to give students the sociological
setting of the rules of law, he will probably prefer to use one of the casebooks
which make more effort to include such material. On the other hand, if he
wishes to emphasize the schematic logic of the criminal law, his choice should
be Hall's, for here is a casebook based upon a studious search for and analysis
of the basic principles that comprise the foundations upon which the entire
criminal law structure rests, and a painstaking tracing of those basic princi-
ples through the entire body of rules. Hall himself says of his method: "The
advantages of having definite targets to aim at should become evident as the
course unfolds-no shooting in the dark, no magical pulling out of rules and
rationes decidendi from the cases by a mysterious 'inductive method' but,
on the contrary, a definite plan of operations and a method of reading the
cases that makes sense." 1
That statement perhaps gives an over-optimistic and over-enthusiastic
picture, but it is true that this casebook, probably more than any other in
the field, is consciously and carefully arranged to provide such a "definite
plan of operations."
HENRY WEIHOFrNf
10. Id. at 29.
11. P.2.
t Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.
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AVALuABiLiTY FOR WopxK By Ralph Altman. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1950. Pp. x-v, 350. $4.50.
As the author remarks, "this is a book about a definition." Fifty-one
jurisdictions (when the District, Alaska and Hawaii are included) have their
own unemployment compensation laws in which it is stipulated that unem-
ployed workers may not draw benefits unless they are able to work and
available for work. This book examines the meaning of this statutory pro-
vision. It is directed primarily to students and workers in the field of social
insurance, for whose benefit numerous case citations have been gathered in
the footnotes at the rear of the volume.
There are many excellent features which make the study as a whole an out-
standing one. It begins with a four-chapter survey of the social and eco-
nomic setting of the problem of availability for work. The influence of labor-
market factors on availability is pointed out-how customary job-seeking
and worker-hiring practices circumscribe the actual hiring market, how
occupational and geographical immobility provides a frame of reference for
the individual claimant's "conservatism of place or occupation," how re-
strictions on entry to job categories make availability at times a reflection
of community prejudices. Labor-force factors affecting availability are
also cited, such as the ageing and feminization of the work force, con-
ditioning the suitability of proffered employment.
The author, Ralph Altman, who writes both from his experience as
Appeals Analyst for the Bureau of Employment Security of the Department
of Labor and from research as a Harvard Wertheim fellow, views the statu-
tory availability requirement "as a gross sieve designed to keep the patently
unqualified from entering or staying in the benefit system." He stresses
throughout the need for a "presumption of availability," a presumption
which he believes has a valid sociological foundation and accords with our
political philosophy. "When availability is in doubt it is usually preferable
to consider the claimant eligible and to look to the results of actual referrals
to suitable work for a more precise answer. When such referrals are not
available, it violates the presumption of eligibility that is every claimant's
due if the claimant of doubtful availability is denied benefits."
This general presumptive principle is joined by other principles which
act as a guide to its substantiation (for example, "Availability must be for a
substantial amount of suitable work") or which serve as a check on its par-
ticular validity ("To demonstrate his availability the worker must look for
work, as instructed by the agency"). In his later chapters, however, Altman
repeatedly emphasizes the preferability of a case-by-case approach to the
definition of availability rather than a principle-by-principle method. "The
meaning of availability becomes real on a case-by-case basis only.. . . It
is of more use to us to know whether a worker who accepts a retirement
pension from an employer is ipso facto unavailable for work than to be able
to give a well-rounded definition of 'available for work.' "
1950]
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An administrative device suggested by Altman to meet the requirements
of flexibility and at the same time to reduce the possibility of bureaucratic
discretionary excesses is the local advisory council. Many state laws per-
mit them, he reports, but they have seldom been activated. In situations
of a crisis nature, such as the indefinite closing of a town's main plant, the
advice of such committees "may transmute the agency decision on benefits
from a bureaucratic decree to a community plan of action." Participation
of both labor and management on such councils is a prerequisite for their
success, he believes.
There are also chapters devoted to specialized aspects of the problem of
availability, such as the cases of the self-employed and of women workers.
One of the noteworthy aspects of this able study is the author's recogni-
tion of the relation of his narrow problem to larger issues. Thus he is mind-
ful of the impact of availability decisions on personal liberties, of their sug-
gestiveness for refining labor-force and unemployment measurements,
and of their relationship to full-employment programs. Despite a general
diffuseness, perhaps arising from an attempt at exhaustiveness, and despite
a poor index, this volume has notably accomplished its purpose.
NEIL W. CHAMBERLAIN t
' Associate Professor of Economics and Assistant Director, Labor and Management
Center, Yale University.
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